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Abstract In this paper I argue for a non-referential
interpretation of some uses of indexicals embedded under
epistemic modals. The so-called descriptive uses of
indexicals come in several types and it is argued that those
embedded within the scope of modal operators do not
require non-referential interpretation, provided the modal-
ity is interpreted as epistemic. I endeavor to show that even
if we allow an epistemic interpretation of modalities, the
resulting interpretation will still be inadequate as long as
we retain a referential interpretation of indexicals. I then
propose an analysis of descriptive indexicals that combines
an epistemic interpretation of modality with a non-refer-
ential interpretation of indexicals.
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1 Descriptive Uses of Indexicals
Descriptive uses of indexicals1 are uses where indexical
utterances express general propositions (see Nunberg 1993,
2004; Recanati 1993, 2005; Bezuidenhout 1997; Elbourne
2005, 2008; Hunter 2010; Stokke 2010; Galery 2008;
Kijania-Placek 2012a). An example, given by Nunberg
(1992) and, in this version, by Recanati (2005), is the
following utterance:
(1) He is usually an Italian, but this time they thought it
wise to elect a Pole
[uttered by someone gesturing towards John Paul II
as he delivers a speech with a Polish accent shortly
after his election]
In this example one expresses not a singular proposition
about John Paul II, but a general one, concerning all popes.
Because ‘usually’ is a quantifier that requires a range of
values to quantify over, and because ‘he’ in its standard
interpretation provides just one object, there is a tension in
this sentence which triggers the search for an alternative
interpretation. The tension is not caused by the fact that
John Paul II himself is the possible referent but it is a
tension between the generality of the quantifier and the
singularity of the indexical in its default interpretation. The
tension would be there regardless of who the referent was.
Intuitively we know that with the use of the pronoun ‘he’
we point at John Paul II and by doing so we make his
property of being the pope more salient.2 It is this property
that plays a role in the truth conditions of the proposition
expressed, which is ‘Most popes are Italian’. In Sect. 5 I
will propose an analysis of the special kind of contribution
of the property retrieved from the context to the proposition
that is characteristic of a descriptive interpretation of an
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indexical and explain the relation of my proposal to other
forms of non-presumptive meaning (Levinson 2000).
Sometimes, however, a descriptive interpretation is
triggered not by a tension between the singularity of the
indexical and the generality of the quantifier, but by the
blatant irrelevance of the referential interpretation—its
incompatibility with a salient goal of the utterance or its
obvious triviality or falsity. This occurs when the singular
proposition that would be expressed if the indexical was
interpreted referentially comes in conflict with the prag-
matic purpose of expressing it, such as warning or critique.
It is then this conflict that triggers a descriptive interpre-
tation.3 In typical cases of this type, the indexical is
embedded under modal operators (Hunter 2010). An
interesting example was again given by Nunberg and is
drawn from Peter Weir’s movie ‘The Year of Living
Dangerously’. Mel Gibson plays a reporter in Indonesia,
Mr. Hamilton, who is investigating arms shipments for
local communists and, of course, he would be in trouble if
they found out. Hamilton, talking to a warehouse manager
and inquiring after the shipments, receives a warning:
-- MR. HAMILTON?
BE CAREFUL WHO YOU TALK TO ABOUT THIS
MATTER.
I’M NOT P.K.I., BUT I MIGHT HAVE BEEN.4
Following Nunberg (1991), I paraphrase the last sentence as:
(2) I might have been a communist
The interlocutor explicitly says that he is not a communist, he
is thus not warning Hamilton against himself. Initially, it is
thus at least unlikely that the semantic value of the indexical
in this utterance is the speaker himself, which would be the
case if the indexical was interpreted referentially. In what
follows, I will concentrate on the analysis of (2), starting
from the metaphysical interpretation of the modality.
2 Metaphysical Interpretation of Modality
Utterance (2) is semantically consistent under the referen-
tial interpretation of the indexical and the metaphysical
interpretation of the modality. Interpreted thus, it would
express a modal proposition in this context, containing a
singular proposition about the utterer of the sentence in its
scope. Such a proposition is true if and only if that very
person is a communist in some counterfactual situation.
Yet that proposition is impotent as a warning: for Hamil-
ton’s safety here, it is totally irrelevant who his current
interlocutor is in a counterfactual situation, as long as he is
not a communist in the actual situation. Somebody must be
a communist in this world to put Hamilton in danger. For
what has been uttered to work as a warning, we cannot
interpret the modality as concerning the speaker’s proper-
ties in some other, counterfactual situation.
Accepting this kind of argument, Recanati (1993,
p. 306) claims, however, that interpreting the modality as
epistemic would allow us to retain the referential inter-
pretation of ‘I’ in (2). This would be important, because
admitting the need of a descriptive, i.e. general, interpre-
tation of indexicals in some modal context threatens his
thesis of the type-referentiality of indexicals. Even though I
will try to show below that Recanati’s claim cannot be
sustained, I think his proposal of the epistemic interpreta-
tion of the modal in (2) is intuitively correct and I will
follow his suggestion below. This intuitive character of the
epistemic interpretation of the modal is probably the reason
why Recanati, as well as MacFarlane (p.c.), assume,
without further argument, that the epistemic interpretation
of the modal solves the problem of ‘alleged’ non-referen-
tial readings of some indexicals in modal contexts.
Because in example (2) we are concerned with modality in
the subjunctive mode, however, the interpretation of the
modality as epistemic is not straightforward. In Sect. 3 I will
introduce extant interpretations of epistemic modality and
show why most of them are inappropriate for the case ana-
lyzed. In Sect. 4 I will show why the one remaining epis-
temic interpretation of modality that is suitable for (2) still
3 Relevance plays a role in all types of descriptive uses of indexicals
(see footnote 13), but its role as the trigger of the descriptive
interpretation becomes prominent when the referential interpretation
is consistent. In such cases, consideration of the type of the speech
act, the purpose of the utterance and possible conflicts with other
pragmatic presumptions (Macagno and Capone 2015) may induce the
search for an alternative interpretation. Since the referential interpre-
tation is consistent and fully propositional, a natural move might be to
propose an analysis of such examples in terms of Grice’s particular-
ized implicatures (see Stokke 2010; Grice 1989). I have argued
against such an analysis in Kijania-Placek (2012a). Here allow me to
highlight the fact that the descriptive interpretation may be retained
under embeddings and in elliptic constructions, which is a phe-
nomenon difficult to reconcile with treating such cases as implica-
tures. Additionally, examples such as (9) below would require
attributing inconsistent beliefs to interlocutors (see Sect. 5.2 below),
which, I think, makes them non-starters for the calculation of an
implicature. Such an understanding of relevance considerations is in
line with the work of Sperber and Wilson (1986, 2004) and Carston
(2002), who insist on the role relevance plays is the reconstruction of
the explicature. I do not place my proposal in the framework of
relevance theory as such, because I wish to remain neutral as to the
special cognitive commitments of this theory (such as the modularity
of mind or the thesis that it is mental representations that refer to
objects in the first place and words refer only indirectly). If a reader
wants, however, to consider the proposal presented in Sect. 5 from
within that theory, it should be seen as a detailed elaboration on the
mechanisms that govern the interpretation of indexicals, and poten-
tially other singular terms such as proper names [for a proposal of an
analysis of proper names in proverbs via the mechanism of
descriptive anaphora see Kijania-Placek (in preparation)].
4 ‘P.K.I.’ is an abbreviation for ‘Partai Komunis Indonesia’.
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gives an inadequate reading of the whole utterance as long as
we retain the referential reading of the indexical. I will then
propose (Sect. 5) an analysis of example (2) that combines
an epistemic interpretation of the modal with a descriptive
interpretation of the indexical ‘I’, and which gives the intu-
itive reading of (2).
3 Epistemic Modality
The epistemic interpretation of modality is concerned with
the knowledge of the speaker or hearer about the world he
lives in. This knowledge is usually represented by the set of
epistemically possible worlds, i.e. such worlds about which
it is not excluded by what the speaker (or hearer) knows
that they are the real world. As Lewis put it:
‘‘The content of someone’s knowledge of the world is
given by his class of epistemically accessible worlds. These
are the worlds that might, for all he knows, be his world;
world W is one of them iff he knows nothing, either explicitly
or implicitly, to rule out the hypothesis that W is the world
where he lives. […] Whatever is true at some epistemically
[…] accessible world is epistemically […] possible for him.
It might be true, for all he knows […]. He does not know […]
it to be false. Whatever is true throughout the epistemically
[…] accessible worlds is epistemically […] necessary; which
is to say that he knows […] it, perhaps explicitly or perhaps
only implicitly.’’ (Lewis 1986, p. 27)
Thus, according to the epistemic interpretation of
modality, an utterance such as ‘‘u might be the case’’ is
true if and only if the truth of u is not excluded by what the
speaker (or hearer) knows in the moment of the utterance
(DeRose 1991; von Fintel and Gillies 2008, 2011;
MacFarlane 2011 or Kment 2012). In effect, the modality
is relativized to the knowledge of a person or a group
relevant in a context; usually it is relativized to the speaker.
This relativisation is typically represented by an informa-
tion base, also called a modal base (MB):
Definition 1 (epistemic possibility I) [von Fintel and Gil-
lies 2008]
MightMB u is true in w iff u is true in some world that is
MB-accessible from w
MB represents the relevant state of knowledge and MB-
accessibility means consistence with this knowledge, so
MB–accessibility is a kind of accessibility function between
possible worlds. Thus, when I utter the sentence ‘Peter
might still be at home’ I do not express the trivial proposi-
tion to the effect that there exists a metaphysically possible
world in which Peter is now still at home, which is always
true as far as contingent facts are concerned. I rather express
a proposition comprising epistemic possibility: ‘From what I
know it is not excluded that Peter is still at home’. So it
might seem that the basic difference between metaphysical
and epistemic modality is that when we know that u is true,
‘Might :u’ may only be interpreted metaphysically (as
true); i.e. our knowledge that u entails the falsity of ‘Might
:u’, if the modality is interpreted as epistemic.5
We should remember, however, that epistemic modality
is relativized to the relevant state of knowledge and this
does not always have to be the knowledge of the speaker—
it may be the knowledge of the speaker or the hearer, or of
both of them considered as a group (see DeRose 1991;
MacFarlane 2011; von Fintel and Gillies 2011; Kijania-
Placek 2012a). This intuitive difference between epistemic
and metaphysical modality might thus require refinement.
But in any case, the epistemic possibility must be consis-
tent with some such knowledge state.
The definition of epistemic possibility formulated above
(Definition 1) is, however, not directly applicable to example
(2), because the sentence is not in the indicative (‘I might be a
communist’) but in the subjunctive mode (‘I might have been
a communist’). DeRose (1991) warns us against interpreting
possibility in the subjunctive mode as epistemic, but already
Hacking (1967) had argued against a simple identification of
the subjunctive mode with metaphysical modality. von Fintel
and Gillies (2008, p. 34) give compelling examples of epis-
temic modality in the subjunctive mode:
(3) There must have been a power outage overnight
(4) There might have been a power outage overnight
If the modality in (3) were to be interpreted metaphysically,
we would attribute metaphysical necessity to this event,
while we rather claim that for what we know it looks like
there was a power outage overnight (or: the evidence shows
conclusively that there have been a power outage overnight).
Modal sentences in subjunctive mode are thus ambigu-
ous and the ambiguity may be considered as the structural
ambiguity of scope between the modal operator and the
past tense operator. I will use Condoravdi’s example to
illustrate this ambiguity:
‘‘(5) He might have won the game
(6a) He might have (already) won the game. [#but he
didn’t]
(6b) At that point he might (still) have won the game but
he didn’t in the end.
In the epistemic reading, the possibility is from the per-
spective of the present about the past […]. The modality is
epistemic: (6a) is used to communicate that we may now be
5 Hacking and DeRose seem to treat it as a necessary condition of an
epistemic interpretation of modality that the speaker does not know
otherwise: ‘‘Whenever a speaker S does or can truly assert, ‘‘It’s
possible that P is false,’’ S does not know that P’’ (DeRose 1991,
p. 596). Compare Hacking (1967, pp. 149, 153).
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located in a world whose past includes an event of his
winning the game. The possibility is in view of the epis-
temic state of the speaker: his having won the game is
consistent with the information available to the speaker.
The issue of whether he won or not is actually settled, but
the speaker does not […] know which way it was settled.
The counterfactual reading involves a future possibility in
the past and the modality is metaphysical. (6b) is used to
communicate that we are now located in a world whose
past included the (unactualized) possibility of his winning
the game.’’ (Condoravdi 2002, p. 62).
According to Condoravdi, the epistemic modality
always takes a wide scope with respect to the operator of
the past. The truth conditions of (5), with modality inter-
preted as epistemic, can thus be defined according to the
following schema:
Definition 2 (epistemic modality II) [Condoravdi 2002,
p. 61]
Might-haveMB
epist u is true in hw, ti iff there exist w0, t0
such that w0 [ MB (w, t), t0  t and u is true in hw0, t0i.
Thus, according to Definition 2, we consider here the
possibility about the past, from the point of view of the
moment of utterance, because it is the knowledge state
from the moment of utterance that is relevant, not the
knowledge state form the past: ‘According to what we
know now, he might have won the game’.6
The metaphysical interpretation of possibility, on the
other hand, may be defined thus:
Definition 3 (metaphysical modality) [Condoravdi 2002,
p. 63]
Might-haveMB
met u is true in hw, ti iff there exist w0, t0, t00
such that t0  t, w0 [ MB (w, t0), t0  t00 and u is true in
hw0, t00i.
Here we consider what has been true in the past and this is
represented by the relativisation of the possibility to the
state of knowledge at a moment in the past and not at the
moment of utterance. According to Condoravdi, epistemic
modality always scopes over the past operator: it is now
possible, i.e. not excluded by what we now know, that it
has been the case that u.
Under the assumption of the mandatory wide scope of the
modal operator, Fernando (2005) claims that the epistemic
interpretation excludes the sustainability of the modal claim if
we know that the embedded sentence is not true. So, although
‘John might have won’ may be interpreted as an epistemic
possibility, ‘John did not win but he might have won’ allows
only a metaphysical interpretation: ‘He might have won, had
he listened to my advice. It was within his reach up to some
point in time’. This particular example about John is quite
convincing and seems to undermine the feasibility of the
epistemic interpretation of the possibility in (2). After all,
since the Indonesian claims that he is not a communist, his
next utterance should not be interpreted as a claim of igno-
rance. We should remember though, that the inconsistency of
claiming that :u followed by ‘It might have been that u’,
where the modal is interpreted as epistemic, is based on the
assumption that the knowledge state is relativized to the
moment of utterance (the wide scope assumption). After the
speaker said that he is not a communist, both the speaker and
the hearer know that he is not a communist.
Condoravdi’s thesis (assumed by others as well)—that
epistemic modality always takes the wide scope with
respect to the operator of the past—has been challenged by
von Fintel and Gillies (2008, p. 43), with the help of the
following example:
(7) The keys might have been in the drawer
The authors do not give a detailed analysis of this example
but claim that here the modality is in the scope of the tense
operator. Portner proposes interpreting this case in the
following way:
‘‘This sentence has a meaning close to ‘‘Based on the
evidence that I had in the past, it was possible that the keys
were in the drawer.’’ (It also has a meaning with the expected
scope, ‘‘Based on the evidence I have now, it is possible that
the keys were in the drawer.’’)’’ (Portner 2009, p. 169).
As I may now know something I did not know before, it is
clear that these two interpretations give different truth-con-
ditions. It is less clear, however, what are the circumstances
that would make the first interpretation more salient. The
situation changes if instead of considering the knowledge of
the speaker, as Portner does, we concentrate on the knowl-
edge of the hearer. Imagine John and Paul quarreling about
who is responsible for losing the keys they have been trying
to locate for the last few days. Assume it is Paul who gave
away for scrap a metal desk without first checking what was
in its drawers. John, irritated, might say:
(8) Many valuable things might have been there. The
keys might have been in the drawer. You should have
checked
A natural reading of this utterance is based on their mutual
knowledge at the moment of utterance: ‘From what we
know it is not excluded that the keys were in the drawer’.
6 An anonymous referee suggested that apart from considering the
moment of utterance we should take into account the location of
utterance as well: something may be possible from the perspective of
here (where the river looks small), but not there (where the river looks
large and unnavigable). But I think that since we relativize the
knowledge base both to the relevant agent(s) and to time, that should
automatically account for the place the agent(s) is(are) at that time
without additional provisions, at least for the cases considered. It
might transpire, however, that such an addition might be necessary in
a fully general definition of epistemic possibility.
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But assume that the keys are found. Still, it seems that John
may sustain his claim:
(8a) Anyhow, the keys might have been in the drawer.
You should have checked
Now we cannot assume that the possibility is relativized to
their knowledge from the moment of utterance, because
‘‘Based on the evidence I have now, it is possible that the
keys were in the drawer’’ is incompatible with the fact that
the keys are found, so they both now know that the keys
haven’t been in the drawer. Yet, John’s utterance may be
interpreted as a reproach: ‘The keys weren’t in the drawer.
But you didn’t know it, so you should have checked’. This
interpretation requires, however, a clear reference to the
knowledge of the hearer at a moment in the past, so the
possibility is indeed in the scope of the operator of the past
tense. And this interpretation of epistemic modality is not
excluded by the fact that we now know that something is
not the case. Thus the alleged difference between the
metaphysical and epistemic possibility—that when we
know that u is true, ‘Might :u’ may only be interpreted
metaphysically—turns out not to be sustainable.
4 Descriptive Indexicals in the Scope of Epistemic
Modals
For the analysis of the initial example about Hamilton,
repeated here in a slightly different version, this last
interpretation—with the possibility operator in the scope of
the tense operator—seems to be the relevant one:
(2a) I am not a communist. But I might have been
The epistemic interpretation of possibility with reference to
the moment of utterance is excluded by the speaker’s
declaration in the first sentence—we know now that he is
not a communist, so his being a communist is not com-
patible with the present state of knowledge. But it is
compatible with taking the state of knowledge of the
addressee from the time before the utterance of (2a) as the
modal base. This new interpretation would be something
like ‘I am not a communist, you were lucky. But for all you
knew before, it was not excluded that I am’.
With this last interpretation we are close to what we
need but we are not there yet—this is only a reproach about
past reckless behavior, while Hamilton received a warning:
(2b) Be careful who you talk to about this matter. I’m not
P.K.I., but I might have been
(2b) is not just a statement about a past reckless behav-
ior—which was not correct but does not really matter
because Hamilton was lucky—but a future-directed
warning, about similar situations, which might not con-
cern the speaker, so his not being a communist is not
inconsistent with them. As long as we retain the refer-
ential reading of the indexical, the sense of the warning is
given by neither an epistemic nor a metaphysical inter-
pretation of modality, as they both concern the speaker
himself, who is not a communist, while the warning
concerns Hamilton’s other interlocutors, who are rele-
vantly similar to the present speaker. If the warning
concerned the speaker, it should be cancelled by the
declaration that he is not a communist, but in fact it is
not cancelled and even emphatically strengthened by this
declaration. Thus regardless of whether we interpret the
modality epistemically or metaphysically, we do not get
the sense of the general warning as long as we retain
the directly referential interpretation of the indexical
‘I’ in (2).
Additionally, there are examples of the descriptive
uses of indexicals, in which the sense of the utterance is
not a warning but a reproach, and in which even rela-
tivisation of the possibility to the knowledge state of the
hearer in the past does not yield adequate interpretation
as long as we retain the referential reading of the
indexical. To illustrate, I will consider Borg’s example,
which is based on examples by Recanati (1993) and
Nunberg (1993):
‘‘(9) You shouldn’t have done that, she might have been
a dangerous criminal.
said to the child who has just let her sweet, grey-haired
grandmother in, but without checking first to see who it
was’’. (Borg 2002, p. 14).
In this case, even reference to the child’s knowledge at
the time before opening the door would not make an
epistemic interpretation of the modal tenable as long as
we retain the referential reading of ‘she’ in (9), because
the child always knew that the grandmother was not a
criminal (we assume that she was not). Thus the epistemic
interpretation of the modal gives absurd results regardless
of whose knowledge and at what time is taken into
account if the knowledge concerns the grandmother her-
self. And a metaphysical interpretation of the modal fares
no better as it gives either a trivial or a manifestly false
(if we exclude the world in which the grandmother is a
criminal from accessible worlds) proposition. The inten-
ded proposition expressed by (9) is a general one, con-
cerning whoever is at the door.
What is required is a mechanism that would combine the
epistemic interpretation of modals for cases such as (2) and
(9) with non-referential interpretation of the indexicals. In
what follows I will propose such an interpretation.
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5 Descriptive Anaphora
5.1 The Mechanism of Descriptive Anaphora
I propose treating descriptive uses of indexicals as a special
kind of anaphoric use which I call descriptive. In the
mechanism of descriptive anaphora, the antecedent of the
anaphora stems from the extra-linguistic context: it is an
object identified through the linguistic meaning of the
pronoun (in the case of pure indexicals) or by demonstra-
tion (for demonstratives). In a communication context,
those objects serve as a means of expressing content and, as
such, they acquire semantic properties.7 The antecedent is
used as a pointer to a property corresponding to it in a
contextually salient manner and that property contributes to
the general proposition expressed. The context must be
very specific in order to supply just one such property,
which explains why there are not many convincing
examples of the felicitous use of descriptive indexicals.
The structure of the general proposition is determined by a
binary quantifier, usually the very quantifier that triggered
the mechanism of descriptive anaphora in the first place.
The anaphora is descriptive in the sense that the antecedent
does not provide a referent for the pronoun. It gives a
property which is not a referent—the property retrieved
from the context serves as a context set that limits the
domain of the quantification of the quantifier (see Kijania-
Placek 2012a, b, 2014, 2015 and (under review)).
My proposal should be seen as falling within the field of
truth-conditional pragmatics, i.e. theories that allow that
‘‘pragmatics and semantics […] mix in fixing truth-condi-
tional content’’ (Recanati 2010, p. 3) of the proposition
expressed and according to which pragmatic contribution is
not limited to providing values to indexical elements of a
sentence (Jaszczolt 1999; Recanati 2004, 2010; Sperber
and Wilson 1986, 2004; Carston 2002; Levinson 2000;
Kamp 1981; Heim 1988; Magnano and Capone 2015). At
the same time, I consider the descriptive interpretation of
indexicals to be cases of non-presumptive meaning
(Levinson 2000) and interpretations of not types but tokens
of expressions. That is because I consider the descriptive
use of an indexical not to be its basic use. The descriptive
interpretation process is triggered exactly by the semantic
inadequacy of its basic (presumptive, preferred) uses:
deictic, (classically) anaphoric, or deferred.8 Typically,
descriptive anaphora is triggered at the level of linguistic
meaning by the use of quantifying words such as ‘tradi-
tionally’, ‘always’, or ‘usually’, whose linguistic meanings
clash with the singularity of the default referential reading
of indexicals (and those quantifiers need not be overt).
As a result, the pronoun’s basic referential function is
suppressed.
Treating descriptive interpretation of indexicals as
cases of non-presumptive meaning does not automatically
mean, however, that they should be treated on a par with
implicatures or metaphorical meaning. Rather, para-
phrasing an argument of Levinson, from the fact that in
language after language all five functions, i.e. bound,
anaphoric, deictic, deferred and descriptive, can be per-
formed by the same pronominal expressions suggests that
their semantic character simply encompasses all five
(Levinson 2000, pp. 269–270).9 In effect, I propose that
indexicals considered as a semantical type are semanti-
cally undetermined, allowing for bound, anaphoric, deic-
tic, deferred and descriptive uses. And while descriptive
interpretation is non-basic and parasitic on failures of the
remaining interpretations, none of the basic interpretations
is the singularly default one (see Jaszczolt 1999 for an
opposing view). I will return to the consequences of this
view for the semantics of indexicals at the end of this
paper.
I will exemplify the mechanism of descriptive anaphora
with the help of example (1),
(1) He is usually an Italian
In (1) the linguistic meaning of ‘he’ requires reference to
one particular person but ‘usually’ is a quantifier that here
quantifies over a set of people (but see below for a quali-
fication). This tension triggers a search for an alternative
interpretation via descriptive anaphora, with John Paul II as
the demonstrated antecedent. I repeat that John Paul II is
not the semantic value for ‘he’ as no antecedent is ever a
value for the anaphora—it gives the value. The salient
property of John Paul II—‘being a pope’—is the semantic
value of ‘he’. ‘usually’ is a binary quantifier—USUALLYx
(u(x), w(x))—analyzed according to the generalized
7 Compare Frege’s treatment of objects as means of expressing
content (e.g. Frege 1892, 1897, 1918; Ku¨nne 1992; Poller 2008;
Kripke 2008 and Kijania-Placek 2012a and (under review)).
8 Deferred use of an indexical is when, for example, you use a
personal pronoun while pointing at a photograph to talk about a
person depicted in the photograph. Such uses were first distinguished
by Nunberg (1978, 1993). The important difference between deferred
and descriptive uses of indexicals is that in the former the proposition
Footnote 8 continued
expressed by the utterance is still singular, it is just not about the
object demonstrated—the photograph—but about the object related to
the photograph by the relation of ‘being depicted in the photograph’
(for simplicity I assume that only one object is being depicted), while
in descriptive uses a general proposition is expressed. For details
about the difference between deferred and descriptive uses of
indexicals see Kijania-Placek (2012a) and (under review).
9 Levinson’s argument originally concerned just bound, anaphoric
and deictic uses of indexicals.
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quantifiers theory (e.g. Barwise and Cooper 1981).10 The
structure of the proposition is thus as follows:
USUALLYx (POPE(x), ITALIAN(x)),
and USUALLY has the truth conditions of the majority
quantifier:
Mgi  USUALLYx (u(x), w(x)) iff |uMgi \ wMgi|[ |uMgi \
wMgi|11
where g is an assignment and i is a context. Such an
analysis gives the intuitive reading for (1): ‘Most popes are
Italian’.12 In general, the structure of the interpretation can
be given by the following schema:
IND is Qw ) Qx(u(x), w(x)),
where IND is an indexical, Q is a quantifier, u is the
property corresponding to the object which is the ante-
cedent of IND and ) should be read as ‘expresses the
proposition’.
In typical cases, descriptive anaphora is triggered by the
use of adverbs of quantification in contexts in which they
quantify over the same kind of entities that the indexicals
refer to.13 In such contexts the generality of the quantifiers
clashes with the singularity of the default referential
reading of indexicals. Whether there is a clash is, however,
a pragmatic matter, as it depends on the domain of quan-
tification of the quantifier, which for most adverbs of
quantification is not given as part of the semantics of the
word (compare Lewis 1975). If ‘usually’ quantified over
periods of time or events—like in ‘He is usually calm’14—
there would be no conflict between ‘usually’ and ‘he’.
Since in the case of descriptive uses of indexicals of this
type it is the conflict between the generality of the quan-
tifier and the singularity of the indexical which results in
suppressing the referential reading of the indexical, both
linguistic and extralinguistic context play a role here. The
domain of quantification is dependent mainly on what is
predicated of the objects quantified over (linguistic con-
text) but in some cases it relies as well on such extra-
linguistic features of context as world knowledge (see
Kijania-Placek 2015). For example in (2)—in contrast to
‘He is usually calm’—a (relatively) static property is
attributed to the subject, a property which typically does
not change with time, but changes from person to person.
And it is the attribution of this property that is a decisive
factor in determining the domain of people as the domain
of quantification in (2), leading to the descriptive inter-
pretation of ‘he’. For the descriptive interpretation to be
triggered, the predication must be non-accidental, in Aris-
totle’s sense, where ‘‘[a]n accident is something which […]
belongs to the subject [but] can possibly belong and not
belong to one and the same thing, whatever it may be’’
(Topics 102b5ff, Aristotle 2003). If a property is in this
sense accidental, nothing prevents the hearer from con-
sidering different events or times at which it may be
attributed to the same subject, leaving the possibility of a
referential interpretation of the indexical uncompromised
and thus not triggering the descriptive interpretation. At the
same time, the property does not have to be an essential
property of the relevant object, if by essential we mean a
property that is metaphysically necessary. For example
‘being born in Italy’ is a non-accidental property that
cannot be both attributed and denied of the same person,
but, arguably, is not a necessary property. Still the use of
‘being born in Italy’ will trigger a descriptive interpretation
of ‘he’ in ‘He is usually born in Italy’ in a context similar
to that assumed for (1).15
10 I use SmallCaps font style for formal counterparts of natural
language quantifiers and predicates.
11 In what follows M is a model, g is an assignment of objects from
the domain of the model to individual variables, i is a context,  is a
satisfaction relation obtaining between a sentence (or an open
formula) and a model and context, under an assignment; u and w
are open formulas, such as predicates, |A| signifies the cardinality of
the set A, uMgi is the interpretation of formula u in model M and
context i under assignment g, ‘‘\’’ and ‘‘\’’ are the standard set-
theoretical operations of intersection and complement (compare
Barwise and Cooper 1981; Peters and Westersta˚hl 2006; Kijania-
Placek 2000).
12 An anonymous referee suggested that in this and similar examples
the pronoun might possibly be analyzed as indexical over kinds, i.e. as
functioning similarly to ‘the’ in ‘‘The tiger is an endangered species.’’
I agree that we could analyze the use of ‘‘he’’ in ‘‘He [pointing at a
white tiger] is on the verge of extinction’’ as a case of (deferred)
reference to the kind of white tiger (see footnote 8 for the difference
between deferred and descriptive use of an indexical). But in this case
we would treat the kind as a single abstract object (collective class or
whatever kinds are in the ontological sense) and predicate a property
that is applicable to such an objects, in contrast to attributing the
property to individual tigers. In example (1), on the other hand, the
property in question (being Italian) is applicable to individual popes
and not to the property of being a pope or the kind of pope. For a more
detailed argument against treating descriptive uses of indexicals as
cases of reference to kinds see Kijania-Placek (2012a) and (under
review).
13 I distinguish three types of descriptive uses of indexicals. They
differ only with what triggers the mechanism of descriptive interpre-
tation but the mechanism is the same in all cases. Only in the first
type, exemplified by (1), the mechanism is triggered by an inconsis-
tency between an indexical and a quantifier. In the second type,
descriptive interpretation is triggered by the unavailability of basic
interpretations, i.e. mainly the unavailability of a suitable referent in
the context of utterance or the context of a reported belief (see
Kijania-Placek 2012a and 2015). The third type of descriptive uses of
indexicals is the case of irrelevance of the referential interpretation
Footnote 13 continued
and it is exemplified by (2) and (9) below. See also Kijania-Placek
(2012a), pp. 183–185, 205–223, 225–238.
14 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this example and for pointing
out the need to clarify my presentation of this issue.
15 Thanks to an anonymous referee for insisting that I clarify this
point.
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5.2 Descriptive Indexicals in the Scope of Epistemic
Modals
We are now ready to propose an analysis of example (2):
(2) I might have been a communist
The mechanism of descriptive anaphora is triggered in this
case by the inadequacy (irrelevance) of an interpretation
that would retain the referential reading of the indexical ‘I’.
But the mechanism stays the same as in the analysis of
example (1): we search the context for a property of the
speaker, who is the extra-linguistic antecedent for ‘I’. The
aim of the utterance—a warning—excludes properties
uniquely identifying this person in the actual world,
because he said that he himself is not a communist. In this
case his salient property is ‘warehouse manager’. This
property serves the purpose of the context set for the binary




where the truth conditions for the existential quantifier are
the following:
Mgi  EXISTSx(u(x), w(x)) iff |uMgi \ wMgi| = [.
MIGHT-HAVEepist is an epistemic possibility relativized to the
past (prior to the utterance) knowledge of the addressee:
‘From what you knew before, it was nor excluded that there
are warehouse managers who are communists’ (or ‘ware-
house managers whom you meet in Indonesia who are
communists’). Under the referential interpretation this
modal base was the only conceivable (but still unsatisfac-
tory) interpretation. But when we consider the descriptive
interpretation of the indexical, a more natural move as far
as the warning is concerned is to relativize the modality to
the actual knowledge of the speaker, knowledge he shares
with Hamilton by warning him: ‘From all I know, it is not
excluded that there were (and are) warehouse managers in
Indonesia who are communists.’ It is only the last inter-
pretation that gives the content and force of the warning in
this dramatic scene from ‘The year of living dangerously’.
In a similar vein, the epistemic interpretation of
modality, together with the mechanism of descriptive
anaphora, give the relevant interpretation of (9):
(9) She might have been a dangerous criminal
As before, we search the context for a salient property of
the grandmother, who is the demonstrated antecedent of
‘she’. In this case the salient property is ‘being the person
who rung the bell’. The quantifier which gives the structure
of the general proposition embedded under the modal
operator is here the covert definite description quantifier.16
As a result we obtain the proposition:
MIGHT-HAVEepist THEx(RINGS-THE-BELL(x), CRIMINAL(x)),
where the truth conditions for the definite description
quantifier are the expected ones:
Mgi  THEx(u(x), w(x)) iff |uMgi| = 1 and uMgi ( wMgi,
and MIGHT-HAVEepist is the epistemic modality relativized to
the relevant in this context information base, i.e. the
knowledge of the child at the moment of opening the door.
We thus get: ‘Your knowledge at the moment of opening
the door did not exclude it that the person who rung the bell
was a dangerous criminal’.17
6 Conclusion
I have tried to show first that the recourse to an epistemic
interpretation of modals is not sufficient to sustain a ref-
erential interpretation of indexicals embedded under modal
operators in some contexts. If this claim is correct, Reca-
nati’s (1993) thesis about the type-referentiality of index-
icals requires amendment.18 It looks like indexicals are
referential in some types of uses—deictic, (classically)
16 The structure of the general proposition—here embedded in the
modal operator—is provided by a binary quantifier and the quantifier
is not always overt. If the sentence does not contain an overt
quantifier, we reconstruct a covert binary quantifier, in analogy to the
use of bare plurals for the expression of a quantified sentence. It will
usually be the universal quantifier or the definite description, but
which quantifier in particular is the relevant one is a contextual matter
and depends mainly on what is predicated of the objects quantified
over. Compare Carlson (1977) and Kratzer (1995). For the double—
suppressive and constructive—role of context in descriptive interpre-
tation of indexicals see Kijania-Placek (2015).
17 Thanks are due to an anonymous referee for suggesting that
constructions such as ‘‘If I were you, u’’ might provide further
examples in favour of my thesis that some uses of indexicals require
descriptive interpretations in the scope of modal operators. While I
agree that such constructions indeed require descriptive interpretation
of the indexical—since the point of such an utterance is to put
yourself in somebody else’s shoes, it is both metaphysically
impossible and inconceivable that the speaker is identical to the
hearer—I do no think, contrary to the suggestion of the referee, that
they are most naturally interpreted as indexicals embedded in the
scope of epistemic modals. Rather, in interpreting such constructions
I would suggest retaining a referential interpretation of ‘‘I’’ and
relying on descriptive interpretation of ‘‘you’’, an interpretation in
which the semantic import of the indexical is a salient feature of the
addressee. This interpretative move makes the metaphysical inter-
pretation of the modal more salient: the speaker is considering u from
the point of view of a (metaphysically) possible word in which he, the
speaker, is relevantly similar to the hearer, or finds himself in a
relevantly similar situation. The details of such an analysis go,
however, beyond the scope of this paper.
18 See Jaszczolt (1999) for a similar view.
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anaphoric or deferred—while they are not referential in
descriptive uses. Such a piecemeal analysis seems to be in
the spirit of Kaplan (1989), who proposed a referential
interpretation just for one type—deictic—of uses of
indexicals. Additionally, the cases I have considered can be
treated as counterexamples to the thesis of the necessary
wide scope of modal operators interpreted epistemically.
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